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Determinism is a rich and varied concept. At an abstract level of analysis, Jordan Howard Sobel
(1998) identifies at least ninety varieties of what determinism could be like. When it comes to
thinking about what deterministic laws and theories in physical sciences might be like, the situation is
much clearer. There is a criterion by which to judge whether a law–expressed as some form of
equation–is deterministic. A theory would then be deterministic just in case all its laws taken as a
whole were deterministic. In contrast, if a law fails this criterion, then it is indeterministic and any
theory whose laws taken as a whole fail this criterion must also be indeterministic. Although it is
widely believed that classical physics is deterministic and quantum mechanics is indeterministic,
application of this criterion yields some surprises for these standard judgments.
Framework for Physical Theories
Laws and theories in physics are formulated in terms of dynamical or evolution equations. These
equations are taken to describe the change in time of the relevant variables characterizing the system
in question. Additionally, a complete specification of the initial state referred to as the initial
conditions for the system and/or a characterization of the boundaries for the system known as the
boundary conditions must also be given. A state is taken to be a description of the values of the
variables characterizing the system at some time t. As a simple example of a classical model,
consider a cannon firing a ball. The initial conditions would be the initial position and velocity of the
ball as it left the mouth of the cannon. The evolution equation plus these initial conditions would then
describe the path of the ball.
Much of the analysis of physical systems takes place in what is called state space, an
abstract mathematical space composed of the variables required to fully specify the state of a
system. Each point in this space then represents a possible state of the system at a particular time t
through the values these variables take on at t. For example, in many typical dynamical
models–constructed to satisfy the laws of a given theory–the position and momentum serve as the
coordinates, so the model can be studied in state space by following its trajectory from the initial
state (qo, po) to some final state (qf, pf). The evolution equations govern the path–the history of
state transitions–of the system in state space.
However, note that there are important assumptions being made here. Namely, that a state
of a system is characterized by the values of the crucial variables and that a physical state
corresponds to a point in state space through these values. This cluster of assumptions can be called
the faithful model assumption. This assumption allows one to develop mathematical models for the
evolution of these points in state space and such models are taken to represent (perhaps through a
complicated relation) the physical systems of interest. In other words, one assumes that one’s
mathematical models are faithful representations of physical systems and that the state space is a
faithful representation of the space of physically genuine possibilities for the system in question.
Hence, one has the connection between physical systems and their laws and models, provided the
latter are faithful. It then remains to determine whether these laws and models are deterministic or
not.
2Laplacean Determinism
Clocks, cannon balls fired from cannons and the solar system are taken to be paradigm examples of
deterministic systems in classical physics. In the practice of physics, one is able to give a very
general and precise description of deterministic systems. For definiteness the focus here is on
classical particle mechanics, the inspiration for Pierre Simon Laplace’s famous description: 
We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state and
as the cause of the state that is to follow. An intelligence knowing all the forces acting in
nature at a given instant, as well as the momentary positions of all things in the universe,
would be able to comprehend in one single formula the motions of the largest bodies as well
as the lightest atoms in the world...to it nothing would be uncertain, the future as well as the
past would be present to its eyes.(translation from Ernst Nagel 1961, pp. 281-282)
Given all the forces acting on the particles composing the universe along with their exact positions
and momenta, then the future behavior of these particles is, in principle, completely determined.
Two historical remarks are in order here. First, Laplace’s primary aim in this famous
passage was to contrast the concepts of probability and certainty. Second, Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz (1924, p. 129) articulated this same notion of inevitability in terms of particle dynamics long
before Laplace. Nevertheless, it was the vision that Laplace articulated that has become a paradigm
example for determinism in physical theories.
This vision may be articulated in the modern framework as follows. Suppose that the
physical state of a system is characterized by the values of the positions and momenta of all the
particles composing the system at some time t. Furthermore, suppose that a physical state
corresponds to a point in state space (invoking the faithful model assumption). One can then
develop deterministic mathematical models for the evolution of these points in state space. Some
have thought that the key feature characterizing this determinism was that given a specification of the
initial state of a system and the evolution equations governing its states, in principle it should be
possible to predict the behavior of the system for any time (recall Laplace’s contrast between
certainty and probability). Although prima facie plausible, such a condition is neither necessary nor
sufficient for a deterministic law because the relationship of predictability to determinism is far too
weak and subtle.
Rather, the core feature of determinism is the following condition:
Unique Evolution: A given state is always followed (and preceded) by the same history of
state transitions.
This condition expresses the Laplacean belief that systems described by classical particle mechanics
will repeat their behaviors exactly if the same initial and boundary conditions are specified. For
example the equations of motion for a frictionless pendulum will produce the same solution for the
motion as long as the same initial velocity and initial position are chosen. Roughly speaking, the idea
is that every time one returns the mathematical model to the same initial state (or any state in the
history of state transitions), it will undergo the same history of transitions from state to state and
likewise for the target system. In other words the evolution will be unique given a specification of
initial and boundary conditions. Note that as formulated, unique evolution expresses state transitions
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(future only or past only) if desired.
Unique Evolution
Unique evolution is the core of the Laplacean vision for determinism (it lies at the core of Leibniz’s
statement as well). Although a strong requirement, it is important if determinism is to be meaningfully
applied to laws and theories. Imagine a typical physical system s as a film. Satisfying unique
evolution means that if the film is started over and over at the same frame (returning the system to
the same initial state), then s will repeat every detail of its total history over and over again and
identical copies of the film would produce the same sequence of pictures. So if one always starts
Jurassic Park at the beginning frame, it plays the same. The tyrannosaurus as antihero always saves
the day. No new frames are added to the movie. Furthermore, if one were to start with a different
frame, say a frame at the middle of the movie, there is still a unique sequence of frames.
By way of contrast, suppose that returning s to the same initial state produced a different
sequence of state transitions on some of the runs. Consider a system s to be like a device that
spontaneously generates a different sequence of pictures on some occasions when starting from the
same initial picture. Imagine further that such a system has the property that simply by choosing to
start with any picture normally appearing in the sequence, sometimes the chosen picture is not
followed by the usual sequence of pictures. Or imagine that some pictures often do not appear in
the sequence, or that new ones are added from time to time. Such a system would fail to satisfy
unique evolution and would not qualify as deterministic.
More formally, one can define unique evolution in the following way. Let S stand for the
collection of all systems sharing the same set L of physical laws and suppose that P is the set of
relevant physical properties for specifying the time evolution of a system described by L:
A system s 0 S exhibits unique evolution if and only if every system sN0 S
isomorphic to s with respect to P undergoes the same evolution as s.
Two Construals of Unique Evolution
Abstracting from the context of physical theories for the moment, unique evolution can be given two
construals. The first construal is as a statement of causal determinism, that every event is causally
determined by an event taking place at some antecedent time or times. This reading of unique
evolution fits nicely with how a number of philosophers conceive of metaphysical, physical and
psychological determinism as theses about the determination of events in causal chains, where there
is a flow from cause to effect, if you will, that may be continuous or have gaps. The second
construal of unique evolution is as a statement of difference determinism characterized by William
James as “[t]he whole is in each and every part, and welds it with the rest into an absolute unity, an
iron block, in which there can be no equivocation or shadow of turning”(1956, p. 150). This
reading of unique evolution maintains that a difference at any time requires a difference at every
time.
These two construals of unique evolution are different. For example, consider a fast-starting
series of causally linked states (Sobel 1998, p. 89), where every state in the series has an earlier
determining cause, but the series itself has no antecedent deterministic cause (its beginning–the first
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occurs before a specified time. The principle that every event has an earlier cause would fail for a
fast-starting series as a whole though it would hold for the events within such a series. This would be
an example where causal determinism failed, but where difference determinism would still hold.
However, the causal construal of unique evolution is unsatisfactory. Concepts like event or
causation are vague and controversial. One might suggest explicating causal determinism in terms
of the laws L and properties P, but concepts like event and cause are not used in most physical
theories (at least not univocally). In contrast, unique evolution fits the idea of difference determinism:
any difference between s and sN is reflected by different histories of state transitions. This latter
construal of unique evolution only requires the normal machinery of the theoretical framework
sketched earlier in order to cash out these differences and so avoids controversies associated with
causal determinism.
Determinism in Classical Mechanics
Most philosophers take classical mechanics to be the archetype of a deterministic theory. Prima
facie Newton’s laws satisfy unique evolution (see Newtonian Mechanics). After all, these are
ordinary differential equations and one has uniqueness and existence proofs for them. Furthermore,
there is at least some empirical evidence that macroscopic objects behave approximately as these
laws describe. Still, there are some surprises and controversy regarding the judgment that classical
mechanics is a deterministic theory.
For example, as Keith Hutchinson (1993, p. 320) notes, if the force function varies as the
square root of the velocity, then a specification of the initial position and velocity of a particle does
not fix a unique evolution of the particle in state space (indeed, the particle can sit stationary for an
arbitrary length of time and then spontaneously begin to move). Hence, such a force law is not
deterministic. There are a number of such force functions consistent with Newton’s laws, but that
fail to satisfy unique evolution. Therefore, the judgment that classical mechanics is a deterministic
theory is false.
Newtonian Gravity. One might think that the set of force functions leading to violations of unique
evolution represents an unrealistic set so that all force laws of classical mechanics really are
deterministic. However, worries for determinism await one even in the case of point particles
interacting under Isaac Newton’s force of gravity, the paradigm case of determinism that Laplace
had in mind.
In 1897 the French mathematician Paul Painlevé conjectured that a system of point-
particles interacting only under Newton’s force of gravity could all accelerate to spatial infinity within
a finite time interval. (The source of the energy needed for this acceleration is the infinite potential
well associated with the inverse-square law of gravitation.) If particles could disappear to ‘spatial
infinity,’ then unique evolution would break down because solutions to the equations of motion no
longer would be guaranteed to exist. Painlevé’s conjecture was proven by Zhihong Xia (1992) for a
system of  five point-masses.
Though provocative, these results are not without controversy. For example, there are two
interesting possibilities for interpreting the status of these particles that have flown off to spatial
infinity. On the one hand, one could say the particles have left the universe and now has some
indefinite properties. On the other hand, one could say that the particles no longer exists. Newton’s
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to be taken as predictions of Newton’s gravitational theory of point particles, or as indications that
the theory is breaking down because particle position becomes undefined? Perhaps such behavior is
an artifact of a spatially infinite universe. If the universe is finite, particle positions are always
bounded and such violations of unique evolution are not possible.
Diagnosis. Other failures of unique evolution in classical mechanics can be found in John Earman’s
(1986) survey. What is one to say, then, about the uniqueness and existence theorems for the
equations of motion, the theorems that appear so suggestive of unique evolution? The root problem
of these failures to satisfy unique evolution can be traced back to the fact that one’s mathematical
theorems only guarantee existence and uniqueness locally in time. This means that the equations of
motion only have unique solutions for some interval of time. This interval might be short and, as time
goes on, the interval of time for which such solutions exist might get shorter or even shrink to zero in
such a way that after some period solutions cease to exist. So determinism might hold locally, but
this does not guarantee determinism must hold globally.
Determinism in Special and General Relativity
Special relativity provides a much more hospitable environment for determinism. This is primarily
due to two features of the theory: (1) no process or signal can travel faster than the speed of light,
and (2) the spacetime structure is static. The first feature rules out unbounded-velocity systems,
while the second guarantees there are no singularities in spacetime. Given these two features, global
existence and uniqueness theorems can be proven for cases like source-free electromagnetic fields
so that unique evolution is not violated when appropriate initial data are specified on a space-like
hypersurface. Unfortunately, when electromagnetic sources or gravitationally interacting particles
are added to the picture, the status of unique evolution becomes much less clear.
In contrast, general relativity presents problems for guaranteeing unique evolution. For
example, there are spacetimes for which there are no appropriate specifications of initial data on
space-like hypersurfaces yielding global existence and uniqueness theorems. In such spacetimes,
unique evolution is easily violated. Furthermore, problems for unique evolution arise from the
possibility of naked singularities (singularities not hidden behind an event horizon). One way a
singularity might form is from gravitational collapse. The usual model for such a process involves the
formation of an event horizon (i.e., a black hole). Although a black hole has a singularity inside the
event horizon, outside the horizon at least determinism is okay, provided the spacetime supports
appropriate specifications of initial data compatible with unique evolution. In contrast, a naked
singularity has no event horizon. The problem here is that anything at all could pop out of a naked
singularity, violating unique evolution. To date, no general, convincing forms of hypotheses ruling out
such singularities have been proven (so-called cosmic censorship hypotheses).
Determinism in Quantum Mechanics
In contrast to classical mechanics philosophers often take quantum mechanics to be an
indeterministic theory. Nevertheless, so-called pilot-wave theories pioneered by Louis de Broglie
and David Bohm are explicitly deterministic while still agreeing with experiments. Roughly speaking,
this family of theories treats a quantum system as consisting of both a wave and a particle. The wave
evolves deterministically over time according to the Schrödinger equation and determines the motion
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view of quantum mechanics and contrasts strongly with the more orthodox interpretation. The latter
takes the wave to evolve deterministically according to Schrödinger’s equation and treats particle-
like phenomena indeterministically in a measurement process (such processes typically violate
unique evolution because the particle system can be in the same state before measurement, but still
yield many different outcomes after measurement). Pilot-wave theories show that quantum
mechanics need not be indeterministic.
Deterministic Chaos
Some philosophers have thought that the phenomenon of deterministic chaos–the extreme sensitivity
of a variety of classical mechanics systems such that roughly even the smallest change in initial
conditions can lead to vastly different evolutions in state space–might actually show that classical
mechanics is not deterministic. However, there is no real challenge to unique evolution here as each
history of state transitions in state space is still unique to each slightly different initial condition.
Of course, classical chaotic systems are typically considered as if there is no such thing as
quantum mechanics. But suppose one considers a combined system such that quantum mechanics is
the source of the small changes in initial conditions for one’s classical chaotic system? Would such a
system fail to satisfy unique evolution? The worry here is that since there is no known lower limit to
the sensitivity of classical chaotic systems, nothing can prevent the possibility of such systems
amplifying a slight change in initial conditions due to a quantum event so that the evolution of the
classical chaotic system is dramatically different than if the quantum event had not taken place.
Indeed, some philosophers argue that unique evolution must fail in such circumstances.
However, such sensitivity arguments depend crucially on how quantum mechanics itself and
measurements are interpreted as well as on where the cut is made distinguishing between what is
observed and what is doing the observing (e.g., is the classical chaotic system serving as the
measuring device for the quantum change in initial conditions?). Although considered abstractly,
sensitivity arguments do correctly lead to the conclusion that quantum effects can be amplified by
classical chaotic systems; they do not automatically render one’s classical plus quantum system
indeterministic. Furthermore, applying such arguments to concrete physical systems shows that the
amplification process may be severely constrained. For example investigating the role of quantum
effects in the process of chaos in the friction of sliding surfaces indicates that quantum effects might
be amplified by chaos to produce a difference in macroscopic behavior only if the fluctuations are
large enough to break molecular bonds and are amplified quickly enough.
Broader Implications
Finally, what of broader implications of determinism and indeterminism in physical theories?
Debates about free will and determinism are one place where the considerations in this entry might
be relevant. One of the most discussed topics in this regard is the consequence argument, which
may be put informally as follows: If determinism is true, then a person’s acts are consequences of
laws and events in the remote past. But what went on before a person was born is not up to the
person and neither are the laws. Therefore, the consequences of these laws and events–including a
person’s present acts–are not up to the person. Whether or not the relevant laws satisfy unique
evolution is one factor in the evaluation of this argument.
What of broader philosophical thinking about psychological determinism or the thesis that
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simply does not have any theories in the behavioral sciences that are amenable to analysis under the
criterion of unique evolution. Indeed, attempts to apply the criterion in psychology do not lead to
clarification of the crucial issues (Bishop 2002).
With regards to the universe, it has been common practice since the seventeenth century for
philosophers to look to their best scientific theories as guides to the truth of determinism. As we
have seen, our current best theories in physics are remarkably unclear about the truth of
determinism in the physical sciences, so the current guides do not appear to be so helpful. Even if
the best theories were clear on the matter of determinism in their province, there is a further problem
awaiting their application to metaphysical questions about the universe as a whole. Recall the crucial
faithful model assumption. In many contexts this assumption is fairly unproblematic. However, if the
system in question is nonlinear–that is to say, has the property that a small change in the state or
conditions of the system is not guaranteed to result in a small change in the system’s behavior–this
assumption faces serious difficulties (indeed, a strongly idealized version of the assumption, the
perfect model scenario is needed but also runs into difficulties regarding drawing conclusions about
the systems one is modeling). Since the universe is populated with such systems–indeed, it is likely
to be nonlinear itself–one’s purchase on applying our best laws and theories to such systems or the
universe as a whole to answer the large metaphysical question about determinism is quite
problematic.
Bibliography
Relevant historical material on determinism:
James, William. “The Dilemma of Determinism.” In The Will to Believe and Other Essays in
Popular Philosophy and Human Immortality. New York: Dover Publications, 1956.
Laplace, Pierre Simon de A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities. Translated by Frederick
Wilson Truscott and Frederick Lincoln Emory. New York: Dover Publications,
1814/1951.
Leibniz, Gottfried, Wilhelm “Von dem Verhängnisse.” In Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung
der Philosophie, Vol. 2. Edited by Ernst Cassirer and Artur Buchenau. Leipzig: Meiner,
1924.
Nagel, Ernst. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. New
York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961.
Sobel, Jordan. Howard Puzzles for the Will: Fatalism, Newcomb and Samarra, Determinism
and Omniscience. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998.
Laplace’s vision expressed in the modern framework of physical theories, as well as discussions of
chaos, prediction and determinism, may be found in:
Bishop, Robert C. “On Separating Predictability and Determinism.” Erkenntnis
58(2003):169-188.
Bishop, Robert. C. and Kronz, Frederick M. “Is Chaos Indeterministic?” In
Language, Quantum, Music: Selected Contributed Papers of the Tenth International
Congress of Logic, Methodology & Philosophy of Science, Florence, August 1995. Edited
by Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara, Roberto Giuntini and Federico Laudisa. Boston: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1999.
8Hobbs, Jesse. “Chaos and Indeterminism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21(1991):141-
164.
Stone, M. A. “Chaos, Prediction and Laplacean Determinism.” American Philosophical
Quarterly 26(1989):123-131.
There are a number of able discussions of problems for determinism in physical theories. The
following all discuss classical physics; see Earman (1986, 2004) for discussions of determinism in
relativistic physics:
Earman, John. A Primer on Determinism. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel
Publishing, 1986.
Earman, John. “ Determinism: What We Have Learned and What We Still Don’t Know.” In
Freedom and Determinism. Edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke and
David Shier. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2004, pp. 21-46.
Hutchinson, Keith. “Is Classical Mechanics Really Time-Reversible and Deterministic?”
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44(1993):307-323.
Xia, Zhihong “The Existence of Noncollision Singularities in Newtonian Systems.” Annals of
Mathematics 135 (3) (1992):411-468.
Uniqueness and existence proofs for differential equations are discussed by:
Arnold, V. I. Geometrical Methods In The Theory Of Ordinary Differential Equations, 2nd
ed. Translated by Joseph Szücs. Edited by Mark Levi. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1988.
For a discussion of deterministic versions of quantum mechanics, see:
Bohm, David. Causality and Chance in Modern Physics. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1957.
Cushing, James T. Quantum Mechanics: Historical Contingency and the Copenhagen
Hegemony. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Possible consequences of determinism for free will in terms of the consequence argument may be
found in:
Kane, Robert, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press,
2002.
van Inwagen, Peter. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.
For a discussion of difficulties in applying determinism as unique evolution to psychology, see:
Bishop, Robert  C. “Deterministic and Indeterministic Descriptions.” In Between Chance and
Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Edited by Harald Atmanspacher and
Robert C. Bishop. Thorverton: Imprint Academic, 2002.
Elements of the faithful model assumption have received some scrutiny in recent physics literature. In
particular, there is evidence that perfect models are not guaranteed to describe system behavior in
nonlinear contexts:
Judd, Kevin, and Smith, Leonard. “Indistinguishable States I: Perfect Model Scenario.”
Physica D 151(2001):125-141.
9Judd, Kevin, and Smith, Leonard. “Indistinguishable States II: Imperfect Model Scenarios.”
Physica D 196(2004):224-242.
Smith, Leonard A. “Disentangling Uncertainty and Error: On the Predictability of Nonlinear
Systems.” In Nonlinear Dynamics and Statistics. Edited by A. I. Mees. Boston:
Birkäuser, 2001.
